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INTRODUCTION 
For several years now, there has been an ongoing debate as to 
whether software patents actually stifle, rather than promote, 
innovation in the marketplace.  A leading commentator published 
an article in the Atlantic two summers ago, suggesting that patent 
protection in the software industry is unnecessary given the 
industry’s natural incentives for innovation.1  In response, another 
commentator wrote a follow-up article arguing that the current 
assault on software patents is part of a much larger effort by critics 
to weaken the patent system by tightening the requirements of 
patent-eligibility and patentability.2  The same anti-patent 
                                                                                                             
*  Kyle O. Logan is a patent examiner at the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office (PTO).  The views expressed herein are my own and do not necessarily represent 
the views of the PTO. 
1 See Richard Posner, Why There Are Too Many Patents in America, ATLANTIC (July 
12, 2012, 10:20 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/print/2012/07/why-there-are-
too-many-patent-in-america/259725. 
2 See Richard Epstein, Richard Posner Gets It Wrong, DEFINING IDEAS (July 31, 
2012), http://www.hoover.org/publications/defining-ideas/article/123926. 
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sentiment expressed in the Atlantic article was echoed in a recent 
article appearing in the New York Times, criticizing software 
patents for being too conceptual and vague.3  By contrast, some 
would argue, and rightly so, that such rhetoric is based on nothing 
more than mere speculation and conjecture as innovation and 
patent protection in this country have been inextricably tied 
together since our nation’s founding and an overwhelming 
majority of patents litigated thus far in the smartphone patent wars 
have been declared valid.4 
The explosion of patent litigation at the district court level in 
recent years has paved the way towards the latest round of 
discussions in the debate.  Since the mid-2000s, roughly 21,000 
patent cases have been filed.5  From 2007 to 2009, the total number 
of patent cases filed per year fell just shy of 3,000.6  By 2010, that 
number reached 3,301.7  The following year, it climbed 22% to 
4,015.8  And last year, the final tally rose 29% to 5,189, an all-time 
record high.9  During that period, cases involving software patents 
accounted for less than half of all filings.10  Yet, they accounted for 
about 89% of the increase in defendants haled into court over the 
same period.11 
Operating under the assumption that the increase in software 
patent litigation was largely due to the untoward behavior of 
certain nonpracticing entities (NPE), the White House 
administration decided earlier this summer to crack down on one 
                                                                                                             
3 See Charles Duhigg & Steve Lohr, The Patent, Used as a Sword, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/08/technology/patent-wars-among-tech-giants-ca
n-stifle-competition.html?pagewanted=all. 
4 See David J. Kappos, Investing in America’s Future, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 485, 
486–87 (2013). 
5 See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 2013 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY (2013), available 
at http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/forensic-services/publications/assets/2013-patent-litiga
tion-study.pdf. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 See U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: 
ASSESSING FACTORS THAT AFFECT PATENT INFRINGEMENT LITIGATION COULD HELP 
IMPROVE PATENT QUALITY 14 (2013), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets
/660/657103.pdf. 
2014] STEP-PLUS-FUNCTION CLAIMS 909 
 
type of NPE in particular: patent monetization entities (PME).12  
PMEs, also known as patent assertion entities (PAE) or more 
pejoratively as patent trolls, refer to firms which acquire patents 
from others for the sole purpose of asserting them for profit.  In so 
doing, the White House issued several executive orders and 
legislative recommendations to protect patent holders from such 
litigation.13 
However, it was not until last month, according to a report 
published by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
as mandated by section 34 of the 2011 Leahy-Smith America 
Invents Act (AIA), that we learned about the actual impact of 
NPEs on litigation today.14  Contrary to popular opinion, the GAO 
report found that between 2007 and 2011 PMEs accounted for only 
about 20% of all filings.15  Stopping short of finding a patent 
litigation crisis, the GAO did nonetheless note that the patent and 
litigation systems could stand to benefit from greater transparency 
in handling cases.16  As to the patent system, the GAO 
recommended specifically that the PTO—the government agency 
responsible for issuing patents—consider boosting patent quality 
by sifting through internal data on the prosecution history of 
patents involved in litigation, identifying any undesirable patterns 
in examination, and modifying its examination practice 
accordingly.17 
In sifting through the data, the avenue du jour for many 
litigants has been to challenge the subject matter eligibility of a 
patent in view of Bilski v. Kappos, where the U.S. Supreme Court 
held that the claims in the patent application at issue were drawn to 
abstract ideas ineligible for patent protection.18  Earlier this spring, 
                                                                                                             
12 See Edward Wyatt, Obama Orders Regulators to Root out ‘Patent Trolls,’ N.Y. 
TIMES, June 4, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/05/business/president-moves-to-
curb-patent-suits.html?pagewanted=all. 
13 Fact Sheet: White House Task Force on High-Tech Patent Issues, the White House, 
Office of the Press Secretary (June 4, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2013/06/04/fact-sheet-white-house-task-force-high-tech-patent-issues. 
14 U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 11, at 15. 
15 Id. at 17. 
16 Id. at 36, 39. 
17 Id. at 46. 
18 Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S 593 (2010). 
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the legal community received the latest installment on section 101 
patent-eligibility when a deeply divided en banc panel of the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit handed down a 135-page 
decision in CLS Bank International v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd.19  The 
decision included one per curiam opinion and six separate 
opinions on the proper approach for determining the subject matter 
eligibility of software-related inventions.20  Needless to say, 
defining this standard continues to be a struggle for courts. 
However, it is worth keeping in mind one observation from a 
recent Federal Circuit decision on subject matter eligibility 
wherein the court noted that section 112 provides powerful tools 
that are more narrowly tailored than section 101 to weed out patent 
claims which are too vague or conceptual.21  Indeed, much of the 
concern over claiming software-related inventions in the abstract 
may be assuaged by enforcing section 112(f) when possible. 
At the heart of patent law lies the notion that the claim defines 
the metes and bounds of an invention.22  Put another way, a patent 
only covers the scope of subject matter encompassed by a claim.23  
Each claim is a formal statement drawn to a specific class of 
invention, reciting the features of the invention.24  Therefore, it is 
incumbent upon claim drafters to fully and particularly describe 
these features for purposes of providing clear notice of the claimed 
invention as well as a frame of reference for determining whether 
the invention satisfies other conditions of patentability.25 
That said, functional claiming is one area in which questions of 
definiteness commonly arise.26  Functional claiming is a common 
drafting technique in which features are described by what they 
                                                                                                             
19 CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. 
Ct. 734 (2013). 
20 Id. 
21 See Research Corp. Tech., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 869 (Fed. Cir. 
2010). 
22 See In re Vamco Machine & Tool, Inc., 752 F.2d 1564, 1577 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
23 See id. 
24 See id. 
25 See Leeds v. Comm’r of Patents and Trademarks, 955 F.2d 757, 759 (Fed. Cir. 
1992). 
26 See Supplementary Examination Guidelines for Determining Compliance with 35 
U.S.C. § 112 and for Treatment of Related Issues in Patent Applications, 76 Fed. Reg. 
7162-01, 7164 (Feb. 9, 2011). 
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accomplish as opposed to what they are.27  Although using 
functional language to limit the scope of a claim is often 
permissible, there is a tendency for functional limitations to blur 
the boundaries of a claim’s scope.28  That is because functional 
limitations cover all of the structure, material, or acts for 
accomplishing a function regardless of the specific means or 
manner for doing so disclosed in the patent’s specification.29  As a 
result of the ambiguity, a broad claim construction may raise other 
issues of patentability by extending the scope of a claim beyond 
the scope of disclosure.30 
Nowhere are the problems associated with functional claiming 
more apparent than in the computer software industry where 
software programs are written in terms of basic functions, 
commands, and instructions to be executed by a computer.31  In 
general, each program consists of one or more algorithms.  
Similarly, each algorithm consists of a finite sequence of steps for 
performing a specific task.32  Along the same lines, each step may 
itself require a conversion of one or more lines of source code into 
executable machine code.33  Given this dynamic, software claims 
thus often describe what the program does, as opposed to how it 
does it.34 
Using functional limitations in software method claims is 
particularly troublesome, because functional limitations by 
definition are inherently broad and often ambiguous.  For example, 
consider the following claim: a computer-implemented method for 
hedging consumption risks in energy markets including the steps 
                                                                                                             
27 See Masco Corp. v. United States, 303 F.3d 1316, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
28 See Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. M-I L.L.C., 514 F.3d 1244, 1255 (Fed. Cir. 
2008); In re Swineheart, 439 F.2d 210, 212–13 (C.C.P.A. 1971). 
29 See Swineheart, 439 F.2d at 213. 
30 See Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en 
banc); In re Hyatt, 708 F.2d 712, 714 (Fed. Cir. 1983).  
31 See generally Brief for the Electronic Frontier Foundation and Public Knowledge as 
Amicus Curiae, CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., 685 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (No. 
2011-1301); Mark A. Lemley, Software Patents and the Return of Functional Claiming, 
2013 WIS. L. REV. 905 (2013). 
32 See generally COMPUTER DICTIONARY ONLINE (2002), available at 
http://www.computer-dictionary-online.org/index.asp?q=algorithm. 
33 See Lemley, supra note 31. 
34 See Fonar Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 107 F.3d 1543, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
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of: (1) initiating a series of transactions with consumers for a 
commodity at a price that corresponds to a risk position of the 
consumers; and (2) initiating a series of transactions with market 
participants for the commodity at a price that corresponds to a risk 
position of the market participants, wherein the risk position of the 
consumers balances the risk position of the market participants.35  
Is the scope of the claimed invention clearly indicated?  Do the 
“initiating” steps recite a function or an act?  Is there more than 
one way to “initiate a series of transactions?”  If so, is the claim 
scope commensurate with the scope of disclosure?36 
To mitigate the potential harm typically associated with broad 
functional claiming, patent law imposes a special rule of claim 
construction upon claims reciting a limitation solely in terms of 
functionality.37  Under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f), these purely functional 
limitations are sorted into two basic groups: those limitations 
pertaining to structure or material and those limitations pertaining 
to acts.38  In patent parlance, the latter are commonly referred to as 
step-plus-function limitations whereas the former are referred to as 
means-plus-function limitations.39  Over the years, this statutory 
rule has been applied in a number of cases to claims on machines, 
manufactures, and compositions of matter (collectively, product 
claims).40  While some may argue that the rule should be applied to 
product claims more often than it is today,41 it is beyond question 
that this rule has been applied only sparingly, if ever, to process 
claims despite the statute being enacted into law over 60 years ago. 
Since 1952, the PTO has issued millions of patents and likely 
millions of process patent claims.  Surely, section 112(f) must 
apply to at least some of those claims just as it applies to some 
                                                                                                             
35 See U.S. Patent Application No. 08/833,892, at issue in Bilski v. Kappos (providing 
the basis for this hypothetical claim). 
36 See Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d 535, 551 (3d Cir. 1981) (explaining 
the relationship between the description and definiteness requirements). 
37 See 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (2012). 
38 See O.I. Corp. v. Tekmar Co., 115 F.3d 1576, 1582–83 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (construing 
what is now recognized as § 112(f) as applying to two types of functional limitations). 
39 See id. at 1583. 
40 See generally Aristocrat Techs. Austl. Pty. Ltd. v. Int’l Game Tech., 521 F.3d 1328, 
1333 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en 
banc); Greenberg v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 91 F.3d 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
41 See Lemley, supra note 31. 
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product claims.  For whatever reason, the courts and litigants have 
largely ignored this part of the statute.  Assuming that section 
112(f) is in fact one of the “powerful tools” to which the Federal 
Circuit has alluded, it is not unreasonable to conclude that this 
unused tool has some role to play in controlling broad, functional 
claiming in process claims. 
For the critics who have grown increasingly concerned over 
“the general problems posed by the structure and administration of 
our patent laws,”42 the following discussion is an attempt to 
address some of those concerns by shedding light on an area of the 
law with the potential to do just that but in need of further 
development.  For example, what is a step-plus-function limitation 
within the meaning of section 112(f)?  How does one identify such 
a limitation?  How does one distinguish a function from an act?  
May one infer the intent to invoke section 112(f) from the claim 
language itself?  Is the analysis for step-plus-function limitations 
different than that for means-plus function limitations?  If so, why?  
These questions are difficult to answer, which probably explains 
why this part of the statute remains so undeveloped.  However, in 
view of the current controversy over functional claiming in the 
software industry, these questions are particularly important and 
worth revisiting. 
In the first section, I discuss section 112(f) and its underlying 
policy.  In the second section, I review Federal Circuit case law on 
step-plus-function limitations.  In the third section, I discuss some 
shortfalls with the current analysis for determining whether a 
process claim is subject to section 112(f).  In the fourth section, I 
propose a modified approach for identifying step-plus-function 
limitations.  In the fifth and final section, I conclude by calling for 
the Federal Circuit to revisit the matter in order to further equip the 
courts and the PTO with the tools necessary to cabin functional 
limitations by an improved step-plus-function analysis. 
                                                                                                             
42 Posner, supra note 1. 
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I. 35 U.S.C. § 112(F) AND ITS UNDERLYING POLICY 
In general, a claim defines the scope of invention protected by 
a patent.  A well-defined invention during prosecution is necessary 
for determining whether the claimed subject matter satisfies the 
conditions of patentability.43  Likewise, a well-defined invention 
during litigation is necessary for properly disposing of a claim of 
invalidity or infringement.44  Accordingly, the law requires an 
applicant seeking patent protection to particularly point out and 
distinctly claim what is regarded as the invention.45 
Throughout the history of our patent system, however, the 
requirement of definiteness has been a moving target.46  Prior to 
the Patent Act of 1952, a common law for functional claiming 
began to take root in courts across the country: using functional 
language to recite novel features of an invention renders a claim 
invalid for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the 
invention.47  This restrictive view culminated at the Supreme Court 
in the case of Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker.48 
There, the claims at issue were drawn to an improvement over 
a system for pumping oil from low-pressure oil wells, the 
improvement being a mechanical acoustical resonator designed to 
receive and amplify sound waves emanating from objects within 
the well.49  In a typical claim, the improvement was defined as a 
“means associated with [a] pressure responsive device for tuning 
                                                                                                             
43 Leeds v. Comm’r of Patents & Trademarks, 955 F.2d 757, 759 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
44 See id. 
45 See 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2012) (providing in the second paragraph of section 112 
that “[t]he specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out 
and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention”). 
46 See Homer J. Schneider, Claims to Fame, 71 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 143, 
152 (1989). 
47 See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Co., 304 U.S. 364, 368 (1938) 
(invalidating the claims at issue for “fail[ing] to make a disclosure sufficiently definite” 
as required by 35 U.S.C. § 33, now recognized as 35 U.S.C. § 112(b)).  Section 33 
required the patentee to “particularly point out and distinctly claim the part, 
improvement, or combination which he claims as his invention or discovery.” 35 U.S.C. 
§ 33.  Claims which recited functional language at the exact point of novelty were often 
invalidated for failing to adequately describe the invention. See Gen. Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 
at 369.  Although the terminology for this ground of rejection has since changed, the 
requirement of definiteness remains the same. 
48 See Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1, 2 (1946). 
49 See id. at 3, 7. 
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[an echo] receiving means to the frequency of echoes” emanating 
from those objects.50 
The Court held the claims invalid for using functional language 
at the exact point of novelty, and thereby failing to adequately 
describe the invention.51  It reasoned that an adequate description 
required a “full, clear, concise, and exact” description of the 
invention.52  Rather than defining the improvement in terms of its 
physical structure and arrangement in the combination, the 
                                                                                                             
50 Claim 1, at issue in the case, reads as follows: 
In an apparatus for determining the location of an 
obstruction in a well having therein a string of assembled tubing 
sections interconnected with each other by coupling collars, means 
communicating with said well for creating a pressure impulse in said 
well echo receiving means including a pressure responsive device 
exposed to said well for receiving pressure impulses from the well 
and for measuring the lapse of time between the creation of the 
impulse and the arrival at said receiving means of the echo from said 
obstruction, and means associated with said pressure responsive 
device for tuning said receiving means to the frequency of echoes 
from the tubing collars of said tubing sections to clearly distinguish 
the echoes from said couplings from each other. 
Id. at 14 n.7 (emphasis added); U.S. Pat. No. 2,156,519 col. 11, l. 64 to col. 12, l. 5 
(issued May 2, 1939) (emphasis added). 
51 Halliburton, 329 U.S. at 8.  Note, however, that in the wake of Halliburton, the 
actual holding of the case was a topic for debate. See Edward S. Irons, Halliburton 
Decision Clarified, 32 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 167, 167–68 (1950) (questioning whether the 
Court prohibited the use of functional language at any element in a combination claim or 
just at the point of novelty).  Some believed that Halliburton not only embraced but also 
expanded upon the standard of definiteness set forth in General Electric. See Leeds & 
Northrup Co. v. Doble Engineering Co., 160 F. 2d 750, 751 (1st Cir. 1947) (stating that 
Halliburton stands for the proposition that functional claiming is indefinite per se).  
Others believed Halliburton held only that a combination claim is invalid for failing to 
particularly point out and distinctly claim the invention if the claim uses functional 
language at the point of novelty. See Robert S. Smith, Functional Claims and the Patent 
Act of 1952, 48 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 426, 431 (1966).  This competing view was later 
validated in Faulkner v. Gibbs, 338 U.S. 267 (1949), where the Court distinguished its 
opinion from Halliburton on the ground that the invention was in the combination as 
opposed to any particular element in the combination.  Nonetheless, even after the Patent 
Act of 1952, some still held fast to the view that the decision in Halliburton was not 
limited to the point of novelty. See Moist Cold Refrigerator Co. v. Lou Johnson Co., 217 
F. 2d 39, 42 (9th Cir. 1954) (explaining Faulkner as substantially narrowing the holding 
of Halliburton by permitting functional claiming in combination claims when the 
invention is in the combination). 
52 Halliburton, 329 U.S. at 2–3. 
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improvement was defined in terms of functionality.53  In the 
Court’s view, the purpose of this requirement of distinctness and 
certainty in claim drafting was to prevent a patent’s scope of 
protection from extending beyond the actual invention.54 
The Court then addressed the danger of allowing functional 
expressions in combination claims at the precise point of novelty in 
fields of invention crowded nearly to the point of exhaustion: 
This patent  . . . illustrate[s] the hazards of carving 
out an exception to the sweeping demand Congress 
made in the [pre-1952 patent statute] . . . . Petitioner 
was working in a field crowded almost, if not 
completely, to the point of exhaustion. 
[ . . . .] 
Under these circumstances, the broadness, 
ambiguity, and overhanging threat of [functional 
claiming] become apparent . . . .  In this age of 
technological development, there may be many 
other devices beyond our present information—or, 
indeed, our imagination—which will perform [the] 
function [specified in] these claims.  And, unless 
frightened from the course of experimentation by 
broad functional claims like these, inventive genius 
may evolve many more devices to accomplish the 
same purpose.  Yet, if [these] blanket claims be 
valid, no device [], now known or hereafter 
invented, whether the device be an actual equivalent 
[] or not, could be used in a combination such as 
this, during the life of [the] patent.55 
Several years later, Congress passed the Patent Act of 1952 
wherein it adopted what is now section 112(f).  In so doing, purely 
functional limitations at the point of novelty were no longer 
indefinite.  Section 112(f) provides that: 
An element in a claim for a combination may be 
expressed as a means or step for performing a 
                                                                                                             
53 Id. at 9. 
54 Id. at 10. 
55 Id. 
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specified function without the recital of structure, 
material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim 
shall be construed to cover the corresponding 
structure, material, or acts described in the 
specification and equivalents thereof.56 
The legislative history is silent on the subject, so the precise 
rationale behind section 112(f) is unclear.  The general 
understanding, however, is that this statutory provision was 
adopted in response to Halliburton.57  The basic idea is that 
Congress amended the statute to permit purely functional claiming 
but addressed the Court’s concern about this particular claim 
drafting technique by making it clear that such limitations would 
not give the patentee any claim scope beyond the scope of 
disclosure in the patent.58 
Under the statute, an element in a product claim that is 
described in terms of function without the recital of structure or 
material for performing the function is a means-plus-function 
limitation, and thereby subject to means-plus-function treatment.59  
As a result, every claim comprising a means-plus-function 
limitation is construed to cover the corresponding structure or 
material in the specification and equivalents thereof.60 
Similarly, an element in a process claim that is described in 
terms of function without the recital of acts for performing the 
function is a step-plus-function limitation within the meaning of 
section 112(f), and thereby subject to step-plus-function 
treatment.61  Each step-plus-function limitation is therefore 
construed to cover the corresponding acts in the specification and 
equivalents thereof.62  Nonetheless, in the few cases addressing the 
issue, establishing what is a step-plus-function limitation according 
                                                                                                             
56 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (2012). 
57 Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 27 (1997); see also 
In re Fuetterer, 319 F. 2d 259, n.11 (C.C.P.A. 1963). 
58 See O.I. Corp. v. Tekmar Co., 115 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also Virgil 
E. Woodcock, Patent Act of 1952—Ten Years of Interpretation: Section 112, 1962 
A.B.A. SEC. PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT 157, 158–59. 
59 See Tekmar, 115 F.3d at 1582–83. 
60 See id. 
61 See id. 
62 See id. 
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to that standard has proven to be difficult for courts due to the 
trouble in distinguishing between the terms “function” and 
“acts.”63 
II. CASE LAW ON STEP-PLUS-FUNCTION CLAIMS 
The first case at the Federal Circuit to raise the issue was 
Serrano v. Telular Corp.64  There, the claim was for a method of 
establishing communication between a conventional landline 
phone and a cell phone via existing telephone networks upon the 
occurrence of a predetermined event.65  In particular, the method 
claim recited, inter alia, a step of automatically determining at 
least the last digit of a telephone number dialed on the landline.66  
The court held that the step was not written in step-plus-function 
form, because it recited only an act as opposed to a function.67  
Unfortunately, the court did not provide any explanation of the 
difference between a “function” and an “act.” 
                                                                                                             
63 See infra Part II. 
64 Serrano v. Telular Corp., 111 F.3d 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
65 Id. at 1580. 
66 Claim 1, at issue in the case, reads as follows: 
A method of interfacing a telephone communications-type 
device which is capable of providing a touch-tone/rotary dial-type 
telephone signal with a radio transceiver used in a telephone 
communication system wherein the transceiver is capable of radio 
communication with a remote radio transmitter-receiver system that 
is part of a telephone network, said method comprising: 
coupling a transceiver to a telephone communications-type 
device which is capable of providing touch-tone/rotary dial-type 
telephone signals in order to allow for at least one-way 
communication between the transceiver and the telephone 
communications-type device; 
said step of coupling comprising converting each dialed 
number of the telephone communications-type device into digital 
data; 
said step of coupling further comprising automatically 
determining at least the last-dialed number of the telephone number 
dialed on the telephone communications-type device; and 
sending each digitally-converted number formed by said 
step of converting to the transceiver for subsequent transmittal. 
U.S. Pat. No. 4,775,997, col. 15, ll. 26–49 (issued Oct. 4, 1988) (emphasis added). 
67 Serrano, 111 F.3d at 1583. 
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Prior to Serrano, the issue was addressed on appeal in two non-
Federal Circuit cases, albeit indirectly.  The first case was Ex parte 
Zimmerley, decided in 1966 by the Board of Appeals at the PTO.68  
There, the applicant claimed a process for recovering 
molybdenum, a metal often used as an alloy with iron, from molten 
slags produced during copper smelting operations.69  The process 
comprised a step of “raising the pH of [a] resultant pulp to about 
5.0 to precipitate dissolved molybdenum as molybdenum 
trihydroxide.”70  During prosecution, the claim was rejected under 
section 112(b) as indefinite for being unduly functional.71  
According to the examiner, the claim did not “recite a specific way 
of raising the pH.”72  On appeal, however, the Board reversed the 
examiner’s decision.73  It reasoned that section 112(f) “sanctions 
                                                                                                             
68 Ex parte Zimmerley, 153 U.S.P.Q. 367 (B.P.A.I. Oct. 31, 1966). 
69 Id. at 368. 
70 Claim 1, at issue in the case, reads as follows: 
A process for recovering molybdenum values in usable 
form from ferruginous, molybdenum-bearing slags comprising: 
subjecting such a slag to a reduction smelting operation 
involving heating the material and a reducing agent to a smelting 
temperature, the quantity of reducing agent, the temperature, and the 
time of said smelting operation being established to effect reduction 
of the molybdenum preferentially to the iron and to form a residual 
slag and a metallic reduction product, the latter containing most of 
the molybdenum present in the original slag but little of the iron; 
separating said residual slag and said reduction product, 
and solidifying the latter; 
leaching the solidified reduction product with a mineral 
acid under reducing conditions to extract the iron in ferrous form, 
whereby part of the contained molybdenum is placed and maintained 
in solution in a trivalent state; 
raising the pH of the resulting pulp to about 5.0 to 
precipitate dissolved molybdenum as molybdenum trihydroxide, 
leaving the ferrous iron values in solution; 
separating the solid and liquid phases of the resulting pulp; 
leaching said solid phase with a caustic solution to extract 
the molybdenum content; and 
separating the resulting molybdate solution from the 
insoluble residue. 
Zimmerley, 153 U.S.P.Q. at 368; see also U.S. Pat. No. 3,314,783, col. 7, ll. 34-63 (issued 
May 6, 1963) (emphasis added). 
71 Zimmerley, 153 U.S.P.Q. at 369. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
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functionally defined steps in claims drawn to a combination of 
steps.”74  As described in the specification, the step of “raising the 
pH” was an industry custom which referred to the practice of 
adding one of several alkalis to molten slags to bring about a 
desired pH level.75  Therefore, the Board concluded that the 
disputed step was not unduly functional, and thereby not 
indefinite.76 
The second pre-Serrano case dealing with this issue was In re 
Roberts, decided in 1973 by the Court of Customs and Patent 
Appeals (CCPA), the predecessor to the Federal Circuit.77  In that 
case, the claim was for a “method of corrugating polyethylene 
terephthalate film which comprises  . . . reducing the coefficient of 
friction of the resulting film to below about 0.40.”78  Rather than 
specifying the grounds for rejection under section 112, the 
examiner simply stated that reducing the coefficient of friction 
“define[d] a result but fail[ed] to identify the specific act or acts 
required to produce the result claimed.”79  In affirming the 
examiner’s rejection, the Board stated that the claims were unduly 
functional for “fail[ing] to define the steps required to obtain the 
desired result.”80 
However, the Board’s decision was reversed by the CCPA on 
appeal.81  Turning to the statute, the CCPA noted that section 
112(f) clearly sanctions functionally defined steps.82  Moreover, 
even if the Board’s rejection were characterized as one of 
                                                                                                             
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Application of Roberts, 470 F.2d 1399 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (interpreting the Board’s 
rejection for being “unduly functional” as a rejection for indefiniteness). 
78 Claim 5, at issue in the case, reads as follows: 
The method of corrugating polyethylene terephthalate film 
which comprises shaping said film at a temperature in the range of 
about 100° to 175° C. by pressing said film between two coacting 
rotating surfaces and reducing the coefficient of friction of the 
resulting film to below about 0.40 as determined by the Bell test. 
Id. at 1400 (emphasis added). 
79 Id. at 1402. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
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indefiniteness for failing to recite the acts required to execute the 
result-defined step, “the absence in the claim of specific [acts] 
which would bring about the desired [result] is no defect.”83  
Because the specification described how to reduce the coefficient 
of friction, the claim was not held indefinite for being unduly 
functional.84 
Although the term “step-plus-function limitation” does not 
appear in the Roberts opinion, the court’s rationale, as well as the 
Board’s rationale in Zimmerley, seems to suggest that the step fell 
within the purview of section 112(f).85  That said, neither case 
provides much of a legal standard for identifying step-plus-
function limitations.86  However, Zimmerley and Roberts do 
illustrate some of the factors to be taken into consideration by later 
courts attempting to draw a distinction between a “function” and 
“acts.” 
O.I. Corp. v. Tekmar Co. was the second case at the Federal 
Circuit to address whether a method claim limitation was written in 
step-plus-function form.87  There, the claim was for a method of 
evaluating an analyte slug in a gas chromatograph comprising “the 
steps of (a) passing the analyte slug through a passage heated to a 
first temperature  . . . and (b) passing the analyte slug through the 
passage that is air cooled to a second temperature.”88 
                                                                                                             
83 Id. at 1403. 
84 Id. 
85 See id. at 1402; see also Ex parte Zimmerley, 153 U.S.P.Q. 367 (B.P.A.I. Oct. 31, 
1966). 
86 But see Lawrence B. Goodwin, Computer Patent Trial Issues: Use and Avoidance of 
§ 112, Paragraph 6, to Make Your Case, 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 809, 827 
(1996) (suggesting that an expression in terms of an ultimate result may establish a step-
plus-function limitation). 
87 O.I. Corp. v. Tekmar Co., 115 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
88 Claim 9, at issue in the case, reads as follows: 
A method for removing water vapor from an analyte slug 
passing between a sparge vessel, trap and gas chromatograph, 
comprising the steps of: 
(a) passing the analyte slug through a passage heated to a 
first temperature higher than ambient, as the analyte slug passes from 
the sparge vessel to the trap; and 
(b) passing the analyte slug through the passage that is air 
cooled to a second temperature below said first temperature but not 
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The Federal Circuit held that neither step was written in step-
plus-function form.89  In making that determination, the court first 
addressed when section 112(f) applies to method claims.90  
Although the statute refers to only combination claims, the court 
stated that a “claim for a combination” encompasses not only 
product claims but also process claims.91  It also stated that “steps” 
refer to process claim limitations, while “acts” refer to the 
implementation of those limitations.92  It, therefore, concluded that 
combination process or method claims are subject to step-plus-
function treatment “only when steps plus function without acts are 
present.”93 
The court then reviewed the claim at issue in a manner 
consistent with this statutory construction.94  Specifically, the 
appellee argued that the statement of purpose in the claim 
preamble implicated section 112(f).95  Apparently, the argument 
was that the statement of purpose automatically converted each 
“passing” step into a step-plus-function limitation.96  In rejecting 
that argument, the court explained that a limitation and function 
must be “individually associated” with each other in order to 
establish a step-plus-function limitation.97 
The court also rejected the appellee’s argument that the 
disputed limitations still implicated the statute because they used 
language nearly identical to the means-plus-function language of a 
related product claim.98  In the court’s view, neither limitation in 
                                                                                                             
below ambient, as the analyte slug passes from the trap to the gas 
chromatograph. 
Id. at 1579 (emphasis added). 
89 Id. at 1583. 
90 Id. at 1582. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 1582–83. 
93 Id. at 1583. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Id.  Claim 17 reads as follows: 
An apparatus for removing water vapor from an analyte 
slug passing between a sparge vessel, trap and analytical instrument, 
comprising: 
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the method claim recited a “function,” so the claim was not subject 
to section 112(f).99  In any event, the primary question after 
Serrano and O.I. Corp. still remained—how does one distinguish a 
function from an act? 
The Federal Circuit had an opportunity to answer this question 
two years later in Seal-Flex, Inc. v. Athletic Track and Court 
Construction.100  Be that as it may, the court decided to pass on the 
question altogether after finding that the parties had disagreed in 
the prior proceedings on whether the limitation in dispute was 
subject to means- or step-plus-function treatment but had 
nonetheless stipulated to the applicability of section 112(f).101  
Still, Judge Rader stated in a concurring opinion that a proper 
disposition of the case required an inquiry into whether the 
limitation of “spreading an adhesive tack coating for adhering [a] 
mat to [a] foundation over [a] foundation surface” in the method 
claim recited a step-plus-function limitation, a means-plus-function 
limitation, or neither.102 
In view of the similarities between means- and step-plus-
function limitations in terms of form, terminology, and meaning, 
the concurring opinion set forth a framework for identifying step-
plus-function limitations that closely tracks the one used to identify 
means-plus-function limitations.103  The opinion stated that the 
recital of “steps for” in a method claim creates the presumption 
that a limitation was written in step-plus-function form.104  It also 
stated that this presumption is overcome only if the limitation 
recites an act for achieving the function expressed by the 
                                                                                                             
(a) first means for passing the analyte slug through a 
passage heated to a first temperature higher than ambient, as the 
analyte slug passes from the sparge vessel to the trap; and 
(b) second means for passing the analyte slug through the 
passage that is air cooled to a second temperature below said first 
temperature but not below ambient, as the analyte slug passes from 
the trap to the analytical instrument. 
Id. at 1579 (emphasis added). 
99 Id. 
100 Seal-Flex, Inc. v. Athletic Track & Court Const., 172 F.3d 836 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
101 Id. at 847. 
102 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
103 Id. at 848–50. 
104 Id. at 849. 
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limitation.105  By contrast, the absence of “steps for” in a method 
claim creates the presumption that a limitation was not written in 
step-plus-function form.106  Similarly, this presumption is 
overcome only if the limitation recites a function without any acts 
for achieving that function.107 
Turning to the elusive question of how to distinguish a function 
from acts, the concurring opinion openly acknowledged that 
method claim limitations are generally susceptible to either 
interpretation.108  In such situations, the claim and specification 
may provide some context when drawing that distinction.109  
Nonetheless, in the context of the statute, a “function” refers to 
“what [a limitation] ultimately accomplishes in relation to what the 
other [limitations] and the claim as a whole accomplish,” whereas 
“acts” refer to “how the function is accomplished.”110  Note, for 
later discussion, that elsewhere in the opinion “acts” are also 
referred to as steps.111 
Relying upon this framework, Judge Rader turned his attention 
to the claim.112  Specifically, the claim recited a method for 
building a running track over a foundation such as asphalt or 
concrete, the method including a step of “spreading an adhesive 
tack coating for adhering [a] mat to the foundation.”113  Because 
                                                                                                             
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 849. 
109 Id. at 850. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 849. 
112 Id. at 850. 
113 Claim 1, at issue in the case, reads as follows: 
A method for constructing an activity mat over a 
foundation comprising the steps of: 
spreading an adhesive tack coating for adhering the mat to 
the foundation over the foundation surface; 
spreading a first uniform layer of particulate rubber over 
the tack coating; 
then, in sequence, first applying a liquid latex binder to the 
previously spread rubber layer in sufficient quantity to coat 
substantially all rubber particles of said layer then air drying said 
applied mixture until substantially no liquid is visible, then spreading 
a succeeding uniform layer of particulate rubber over the preceding 
layers; and 
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the claim did not recite “steps for,” the limitation was presumed to 
recite an act.114  Given that presumption, the analysis turned to 
whether the limitation nevertheless recited a function to the 
exclusion of any acts.115  Without considering the overall context 
of the claim and specification, the analysis found that the limitation 
expressly stated the function: adhering the mat to the foundation.116  
The limitation also expressly stated the act for achieving that 
function: spreading the adhesive tack coating.117  In other words, 
the function of adhering the mat to the foundation was 
accomplished by the act of spreading the adhesive tack coating.118  
Because the limitation expressed both the function and the act, the 
claim should not have been construed according to the 
requirements of section 112(f).119 
Judge Rader’s opinion, although only a concurrence, marked a 
significant development in the body of case law on step-plus-
function claims, representing the first time anyone had ever 
attempted to construe a “function” within the meaning of section 
112(f) for a method claim.  Nonetheless, the question moving 
forward was just how receptive the rest of the bench would be to 
this proposed analysis. 
Later that year, the patent community had an opportunity in 
Micro Chemical, Inc. v. Great Plains Chemical Co. to see whether 
the Federal Circuit would in fact adopt Judge Rader’s Seal-Flex 
concurrence.120  However, the court left the answer to this question 
                                                                                                             
continuing the aforesaid sequential application of latex 
binder, air drying the binder followed by the spreading of a uniform 
layer of rubber over the preceding layers until the approximate 
desired thickness for the mat is achieved. 
Id. at 839. 
114 Id. at 850. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 850–51. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. at 851. 
120 Micro Chem., Inc. v. Great Plains Chem. Co., 194 F.3d 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
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for another day after noting that the claims at issue would have 
been infringed no matter the claim construction.121 
In Generation II Orthotics Inc. v. Medical Technology Inc., the 
Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment in regards to 
the applicability of section 112(f), because the limitations in 
dispute were not written in step-plus-function form.122  A typical 
claim recited a method for bracing a knee comprising “locating a 
brace about the knee.”123  The brace was defined in the claim as 
having a pivotable joint between a pair of arms and an additional 
“joint in the brace to allow controlled medial and lateral inclination 
of each arm relative to [the] pivotable joint.”124 
In the prior proceedings, the district court applied section 
112(f) based solely on the fact that the term “to allow controlled 
medial and lateral inclination of each arm relative to the pivotable 
joint” ran parallel to the means-plus-function language of a related 
product claim.125  In rejecting the lower court’s rationale that 
                                                                                                             
121 Id. at 1259 (declining to address whether disputed limitations were in step-plus-
function form after concluding that the claims would have been infringed in either 
scenario). 
122 Generation II Orthotics Inc. v. Med. Tech. Inc., 263 F.3d 1356, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 
2001). 
123 Id. at 1361. 
124 Claim 16 of U.S. Pat. No. 5,302,169 (patent ’169) (issued April 12, 1994), at issue 
in the case, reads as follows: 
A method of bracing a knee of a patient following high 
tibial osteotomy comprising: 
locating a brace about the knee, said brace having a pair of 
arms to contact the leg of the patient and a pivotable joint between 
said arms to allow pivoting of the knee while supporting the knee, a 
joint in the brace to allow controlled 
medial and lateral inclination of each arm relative to a 
pivotable joint; and 
adjusting the inclination to provide the required bracing at 
the required inclination. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
125 Claim 1 of patent ’169, at issue in the case, reads as follows: 
In an orthopaedic brace comprising: a pair of arms to be 
secured to a wearer’s body, a pivotable joint between said arms to 
allow pivoting of the knee while supporting the knee, the 
improvement comprising: 
joint means in the brace for allowing controlled medial and 
lateral inclination of each rigid arm relative to the pivotable joint. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
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similar claims should be subject to similar treatment,126 the Federal 
Circuit explained that such parallel reasoning has never been a 
sufficient reason to invoke application of the statute.127  That is, 
claims are construed independently of each other.128 
In so doing, the court noted that the lack of the term “steps for” 
created a presumption against applying the statute.129  It then found 
that the “limitation[] contain[ed] no language that would overcome 
the presumption.”130  Thus, the limitation was not construed as a 
step-plus-function limitation.131 
Generation II illustrates the initial stage of the court’s adoption 
of the Seal-Flex concurrence.  The court’s rationale clearly tracks 
the same reasoning, embracing the principle regarding the effects 
of a presumption on the analysis.  However, the court never stated 
how to rebut the presumption. 
In Epcon Gas Systems, Inc. v. Bauer Compressors, Inc., the 
Federal Circuit took a farther step towards the Seal-Flex 
concurrence by citing that opinion as a basis in part for its 
decision.132  There, the claim recited a method for introducing 
pressurized gas into a resin injection molding process.133  The 
claim further recited a limitation of selectively increasing, 
decreasing, or maintaining the gas pressure within a mold 
cavity.134 
                                                                                                             
126 Id. at 1368. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
132 Epcon Gas Sys., Inc. v. Bauer Compressors, Inc., 279 F.3d 1022 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
133 Id. at 1025–26. 
134 Claim 2 of U.S. Pat. No. 5,118,455 (patent ’455) (issued June 2, 1992), at issue in 
the case, reads as follows: 
A method of providing gas assistance to a resin injection 
molding process of the type in which hot resin is injected into a mold, 
gas is injected into the mold to displace a portion of the resin in the 
mold, the resin cools, the gas is vented and the mold is opened to 
remove the molded part, a supply of stored as [sic, gas] is provided, 
the gas is injected into the mold to displace the resin in the mold 
cavity at a pressure that is at all times during the gas injection cycle 
substantially below the pressure of the stored gas supply, the 
improvement wherein, following the initial injection of the gas into 
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Because the language of the limitation essentially mirrored the 
means-plus-function language of an apparatus claim in the same 
patent,135 the district court determined that the limitation was in 
step-plus-function form.136  The Federal Circuit, however, rejected 
that “parallel” line of reasoning, stating that the applicability of 
section 112(f) is determined on a claim-by-claim basis.137  Citing 
the Seal-Flex concurrence, it then stated that the lack of the term 
“steps for” anywhere in the claim created a presumption against 
applying the statute.138  In the court’s view, the limitation was 
restricted to the recital of acts.139  Accordingly, the court held that 
the limitation was not written in step-plus-function form.140 
In addition to moving the case law closer towards the Seal-Flex 
concurrence, Epcon Gas is of import because it reiterates the 
principle first laid down in O.I. Corp. that claims are evaluated 
independently.141  At that point in time, a frequent point of 
contention among parties was whether a process claim should be 
                                                                                                             
the mold and prior to the venting of the gas from the mold, the gas 
pressure within the mold is selectively increased, decreased, or held 
substantially constant depending upon the particular requirements of 
the molding process. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
135 Claim 16 of patent ’455, at issue in the case, reads as follows: 
An apparatus for providing gas assistance to a resin 
injection molding process of the type in which hot resin is injected 
into a mold cavity, gas is injected into the mold to displace a portion 
of the resin in the mold, the resin cools, the gas is vented and the 
mold is opened to remove the molded part, the improvement wherein 
a supply of stored gas is provided and the apparatus includes control 
means which are operative to inject gas into the mold to fill out the 
mold cavity at a pressure that is at all times during the gas injection 
cycle substantially below the pressure of the stored gas supply and 
which are further operative, following the initial injection of gas into 
the mold and prior to the venting of the gas from the mold, to 
selectively increase the gas pressure within the mold, decrease the 
gas pressure within the mold, or maintain the gas pressure within the 
mold at a particular value. 
Id. at 1026 (emphasis added). 
136 Id. at 1028. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. 
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subject to section 112(f) when it used language nearly identical to 
means-plus-function language in a related product claim.142  The 
idea was that similar claims should be subject to similar treatment.  
Nonetheless, drawing a dividing line between a function and an act 
was a question that remained unanswered. 
That same year, in Masco Corp. v. United States, the Federal 
Circuit finally spoke definitively on the question of how to 
distinguish a function from an act.143  In that case, a typical claim 
recited a method for controlling a combination lock.144  The claim 
also recited that the method comprised a step of transmitting a 
force from a knob to a lever in order to drive the lever into a 
position of contact with a cam wheel.145  In the proceedings below, 
the appellee argued the claim was subject to section 112(f) as the 
“transmitting” limitation was too conceptual and ambiguous to be 
interpreted as anything other than a function.  Siding with the 
                                                                                                             
142 Id. 
143 Masco Corp. v. United States, 303 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
144 Claim 1 of U.S. Pat. No. 5,778,711 (issued July 14, 1998), at issue in the case, reads 
as follows: 
A method of controlling a lock including a knob, a 
rotatable cam wheel operably connected to the knob and defining a 
surface, a locking mechanism movable between a locked position and 
an unlocked position, and a movable lever operably connected to the 
locking mechanism and having a protrusion adapted to engage the 
cam wheel, the method comprising the steps of: 
holding the lever in a position where the protrusion cannot 
contact the surface of the cam wheel and in such a manner that the 
lever and the knob are operably disconnected and the lever will not 
move in response to rotation of the knob; 
receiving an unlock signal; 
forming a rigid connection between the lever and the knob 
with at least one substantially rigid member, while maintaining the 
lever in a position where the protrusion cannot contact the surface of 
the cam wheel, in response to a receipt of the unlock signal; and 
transmitting a force applied to the knob to the lever through 
the rigid connection after the lever and the knob have been operably 
connected to drive the lever to a position where the protrusion can 
contact the surface of the cam wheel in such a manner that the lever 
will be pulled by the cam wheel during rotation of the cam wheel. 
Id. at 1320 (emphasis added). 
145 Id. 
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appellee, the Court of Federal Claims (CFC) held that the 
limitation was in step-plus-function form.146 
The Federal Circuit, however, reversed the CFC’s holding.147  
Guided by the rationale in the Seal-Flex concurrence, the court 
first noted the absence of “steps for” in the claim.148  As a result, 
there was no presumption in favor of applying section 112(f) to the 
claim.149  The court then found that the presumption had not been 
rebutted, because the limitation recited a function and an act.150  It 
stated that the function of the limitation was “to drive the lever,” 
while “transmitting a force . . . to a lever” was the act which 
described how to accomplish the claimed function.151  Therefore, 
the Federal Circuit held that the limitation was not written in step-
plus-function form.152 
Utica Enterprises, Inc. v. Federal Broach & Machine Co. was 
next in the line of cases on step-plus-function claims.153  There, the 
dispute involved two method claims for fastening a broach to a 
clamp for machining operations.154  The first claim recited a 
method comprising a step of locking the broach into a fixed 
position by imposing a locking force on the broach in order to 
securely hold the broach in the clamp.155  The second claim recited 
                                                                                                             
146 Id. at 1326–27. 
147 Id. at 1328. 
148 Id. at 1327. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. at 1327–28. 
151 Id. 
152 Id. at 1328. 
153 Utica Enters., Inc. v. Fed. Broach & Mach. Co., 109 F. App’x 403 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
154 Id. at 405. 
155 Claim 1 of U.S. Pat. No. 6,256,857 (patent ’857) (issued July 10, 2001), at issue in 
the case, reads as follows: 
A method of retaining a broach cutting tool member in a 
broach tool holder, said broach tool holder comprising: 
. . . 
said broach cutting tool member comprising . . . a 
peripheral outer surface . . . said peripheral outer surface having two 
planar abutment surfaces disposed along said peripheral outer surface 
and extending perpendicularly to said top end surface and said 
bottom end surface of said broach cutting tool member, said two 
planar abutment surfaces adapted to be complementary, respectively, 
to said first planar and second planar abutment surfaces, disposed on 
said broach cutting tool holder . . . 
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a method comprising a step of locking the broach and the clamp 
into a fixed position by imposing a locking force on the broach.156 
Although the Federal Circuit correctly concluded that neither 
claim recited a step-plus-function limitation, it is not entirely clear 
how the court arrived at this conclusion.157  After setting forth the 
                                                                                                             
said method comprising the steps of positioning said two 
planar abutment surfaces of said broach cutting tool member 
contiguous said first planar and said second planar abutment surfaces, 
respectively, of said broach tool holder and simultaneously locating 
said bottom end surface of said broach cutting tool member on said 
intermediate surface of said broach tool holder whereby when said 
broach cutting tool member is positioned in said broach tool holder a 
predetermined accurate work position is established for said broach 
cutting tool member; and 
locking said broach cutting tool member in said 
predetermined accurate work position, by imposing a locking force 
on said at least a portion of said third planar abutment surface of said 
broach cutting tool member, said locking force having a force 
component directed towards said two planar abutment surfaces of 
said broach cutting tool member and a force component directed 
downward from said top surface towards said intermediate surface of 
said broach tool holder to securely hold said broach cutting tool 
member in said broach tool holder. 
Id. at 405–06 (emphasis added). 
156 Claim 3 of patent ’857, at issue in the case, reads as follows: 
A method of retaining a broach cutting tool member in a 
broach tool holder . . . said method comprising the steps of: 
. . . 
positioning said first and second planar surfaces on said 
one of said broach cutting tool member and said broach tool holder 
contiguous to said respective complementary first and second planar 
surfaces on said other of said broach cutting tool member and said 
broach tool holder whereby when said one of said broach cutting tool 
member and said broach tool holder is positioned contiguous to said 
other of said broach cutting tool member and said broach tool holder 
a predetermined accurate work position is established; and 
locking said one of said broach cutting tool member and 
said broach tool holder in said predetermined accurate work position 
by imposing a locking force on said at least a portion of said third 
planar surface whereby said locking force generates a force 
component in a direction downward from said first top surface 
towards said second lower surface and a force component towards 
said first and second planar surfaces of one of said broach cutting tool 
member and said broach tool holder. 
Id. at 406 (emphasis in original). 
157 Id. at 410. 
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rule on presumptions regarding section 112(f), the court stated that 
a method claim limitation is in step-plus-function format only if it 
recites a step plus a function without the recital of acts in support 
of that function.158  Reviewing the claims, it first noted that 
because neither claim used the term “step for,” the presumption 
was that the limitations were not in proper form.159  In regards to 
the first claim, the court found that the limitation’s function was to 
securely hold the broach in the clamp.160  It also found that 
“imposing a locking force on the broach” was the act for 
accomplishing the function, because it described how to “securely 
hold the broach in the clamp.”161  The court thus held the limitation 
was not in step-plus-function form as it recited a function and an 
act in support thereof.162 
On closer scrutiny, however, it would seem that “imposing a 
locking force on the broach” better describes how to “lock[] the 
broach into a fixed position” which, in turn, describes how to 
“securely hold the broach in the clamp.”163  Put another way, 
“securely hold[ing] the broach in the clamp” is the function of 
“locking the broach into a fixed position” which, in turn, is the 
function of “imposing a locking force on the broach.”164  
Accordingly, “imposing a locking force on the broach” is the act 
describing how to “lock[] the broach into a fixed position,” while 
“locking the broach into a fixed position” is the act describing how 
to “securely hold the broach in the clamp.”165  Therefore, contrary 
to the court’s analysis, the claim limitation recites a plurality of 
functions and acts.166 
Turning to the second claim, the court held that the limitation 
of “locking the broach into a fixed position by imposing a locking 
force on the broach” was not subject to section 112(f).167  In its 
                                                                                                             
158 Id. at 409. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. at 409–10. 
161 Id. at 410. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. at 405–06. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. at 406. 
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view, the limitation “did not expressly specify the function that the 
‘locking’ step [was] to perform.”  The court nevertheless found 
that the phrase “imposing a locking force on the broach” 
constituted the act for accomplishing the unspecified function.168  
Query how the court was able to determine the act without first 
determining the limitation’s function. 
Upon further consideration, however, there is another way to 
reasonably interpret the limitation.  According to that 
interpretation, the function is to “lock[] the broach and the clamp 
into a fixed position” while “imposing a locking force on the 
broach” is the act describing how to accomplish the function.169  
Nonetheless, neither limitation is in step-plus-function form, 
because each recites a function with an act.  The point here is that 
this case provides yet again another example in the case law of the 
difficulty in distinguishing between a function and an act. 
Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Medical, Inc. is the most 
recent decision on step-plus-function case law at the Federal 
Circuit.170  In that case, the claim recited a heart stimulation 
method comprising a step of “determining a condition of the heart 
from among a plurality of conditions of the heart.”171  The court 
summarily decided the issue, holding that the step was not a step-
                                                                                                             
168 Id. 
169 Id. 
170 Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 381 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
171 Claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 4,407,288 (filed Mar. 16, 1983) (issued Oct. 4, 1983), at 
issue in the case, reads as follows: 
A method of heart stimulation using an implantable heart 
stimulator capable of detecting a plurality of arrhythmias and capable 
of being programmed to undergo a single or multi-mode operation to 
treat a detected arrhythmia, corresponding to said mode of operation 
the method comprising the steps of: 
(a) determining a condition of the heart from among a 
plurality of conditions of the heart; 
(b) selecting at least one mode of operation of the 
implantable heart stimulator which operation includes a unique 
sequence of events corresponding to said determined condition; and 
(c) executing said at least one mode of operation of said 
implantable heart stimulator thereby to treat said determined heart 
condition. 
Id. at 1375 (emphasis added). 
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plus-function limitation.172  Citing O.I. Corp., it simply noted that 
section 112(f) is implicated only if a function without acts is 
present.173  It then found, without further explanation, that the 
limitation in dispute recited only an act. 
III. SHORTFALLS WITH THE CURRENT APPROACH 
Assuming the Federal Circuit’s sole approach to determine 
whether a process claim limitation is written in step-plus-function 
form is the one set forth in the Seal-Flex concurrence, such an 
approach is still problematic.  First, there is a tendency under the 
analysis to read process claim limitations in a way that effectively 
sanctions pre-Halliburton style functional claiming.  Second, there 
is a tendency under the analysis to read process claim limitations in 
a way that contradicts longstanding policy concerns behind section 
112(f). 
According to the current analysis, a limitation in a process 
claim may assume three basic forms.  In the first case, the 
limitation recites only a function.174  In the second case, the 
limitation recites only an act.175  In the third case, the limitation 
recites both a function and an act.176  Although the analysis in the 
Seal-Flex concurrence works for limitations that clearly recite a 
function and an act for achieving that function,177 the analysis 
leaves much to be desired when identifying whether a limitation 
should be deemed either one or the other.178  According to Judge 
Rader, “method claim elements often recite phrases susceptible to 
interpretation as either a function or as an act for performing a 
                                                                                                             
172 Id. at 1381. 
173 See id. 
174 See Seal-Flex, Inc. v. Athletic Track & Court Const., 172 F.3d 836, 849–50 (Fed. 
Cir. 1999) 
175 See id. 
176 See id. 
177 See id. at 850 (finding the function and act expressly stated in the limitation); see 
also Masco Corp. v. United States, 303 F.3d 1316, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (noting that the 
limitation recited the function and act). 
178 Compare Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 381 F.3d 1371, 1381 
(Fed. Cir. 2004), with Serrano v. Telular Corp., 111 F.3d 1578, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1997) 
(construing limitations of simple expressions as acts without turning to other sources of 
intrinsic evidence that call into question those claim constructions). 
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function.”179  Given the ambiguity, it is not uncommon to interpret 
a limitation as an act when in fact the limitation is a function. 
For example, suppose a claim recites a computer-implemented 
method for managing and tracking life insurance policies.180  The 
method comprises several limitations, one of which recites 
“generating a life insurance policy including a stable value 
protected investment with an initial value based on a value of 
underlying securities.”181 
A quick assessment of the claim shows that the limitation 
contains language that may be deemed either a function or an act, 
but not both.  The term “including a stable value protected 
investment with an initial value based on a value of underlying 
securities” is not a separate act, because it is just describing the 
structure of the policy instead of how the policy is generated182.  
Thus, the determinative term in the limitation is “generating a life 
insurance policy.”183  Absent the recital of “step for,” the 
presumption is that the limitation recites only an act. 
                                                                                                             
179 Seal-Flex, 172 F.3d at 849. 
180 Claim 9 of U.S. Patent No. 5,926,792 (Patent ’792) (filed Sept. 18, 1998) (issued 
July 20, 1999), at issue in Bancorp Servs., LLC v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can., 687 
F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2012), reads as follows: 
A method for managing a life insurance policy on behalf of 
a policy holder, the method comprising the steps of: 
generating a life insurance policy including a stable value 
protected investment with an initial value based on a value of 
underlying securities; 
calculating fee units for members of a management group 
which manage the life insurance policy; 
calculating surrender value protected investment credits for 
the life insurance policy; 
determining an investment value and a value of the 
underlying securities for the current day; 
calculating a policy value and a policy unit value for the 
current day; 
storing the policy unit value for the current day; and 
one of the steps of: 
removing the fee units for members of the management 
group which manage the life insurance policy, and 
accumulating fee units on behalf of the management group. 
181 U.S. Patent No. 5,926,792 (filed Sept. 18, 1998) (issued July 20, 1999). 
182 Id. 
183 Id. 
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If in fact the limitation recites only an act for achieving a 
function, then the question becomes: what is that function?  Recall 
under the Seal-Flex concurrence the underlying function of a 
limitation corresponds to what the limitation ultimately 
accomplishes relative to what the other limitations and the claim as 
a whole accomplish, whereas the act corresponds to how the 
function is accomplished.184  It stands to reason that determining 
the act or acts of a limitation presupposes determining the function 
of the limitation. 
That said, it is impossible to say whether the Federal Circuit 
would deem this term a “function,” because the case law has yet to 
explain how to show “what a limitation ultimately accomplishes” 
as required for such a determination.185  However, given that 
software inventions are often claimed in terms of functionality, is it 
safe to presume that “generating a life insurance policy” is a 
functional limitation? 
Consulting the specification would inform the analysis by 
adding context to a determination of the underlying function of the 
limitation.186  Without looking to the specification for the meaning 
and scope of functional language, there is no way to reasonably 
make such a determination.  As a result, the limitation in this 
example is just as likely to be interpreted incorrectly as it is to be 
interpreted correctly. 
One could reasonably infer, in view of this hypothetical, that 
there are a large number of “de facto step-plus-function claims” in 
the patent system today that have evaded the claim construction 
requirements of section 112(f) by masquerading as standard 
process claims.  Consequently, functional claiming today shares 
features with the practice that was rebuked in Halliburton.187 
                                                                                                             
184 Seal-Flex, 172 F.3d at 849–50. 
185 See id. at 849 (stating that a function in the context of the statute corresponds to 
what the element ultimately accomplishes relative to the accomplishments of the other 
elements and claim as a whole). 
186 For a discussion on the function of “generating a life insurance policy” as 
contemplated by the inventor, see Patent ’792 col. 11, l. 60 to col. 12, l. 63. 
187 Compare Lemley, supra note 31, with Smith, supra note 51, at 433–34 (quoting P.J. 
Federico, a key member of the Bryson subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee 
responsible for preparing the first draft of the Patent Act of 1952, who questioned 
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After a careful review of the case law, it is not surprising to see 
how the Federal Circuit has never found a step-plus-function 
limitation.  Unlike the clear, concrete difference between means 
and structure/material in means-plus-function limitations, the 
difference between a function and an act in step-plus-function 
limitations can be an “eye of the beholder” type of inquiry.  
Complicating the matter even further is the fact that both terms are 
defined in terms which are interchangeable with each other.  For 
instance, an “act” is defined as the process of doing: action.188  A 
“function,” on the other hand, is defined as an action for which a 
person or thing “is specially fitted or used or for which a thing   
exists: purpose.”189 
In view of these two definitions, distinguishing a function from 
an act is, on the surface, a distinction without a difference; 
however, a closer inspection reveals a critical but subtle difference 
between the two concepts.  The difference is that all functions are 
acts but not all acts are functions.  Rather than asking whether a 
limitation recites a function or an act, one must ask whether the act 
recited in the limitation rises to the level of a function, i.e., is the 
act the purpose of another act?  The best way to illustrate this idea 
is by example. 
Recall the patent in Utica, which was directed to a process for 
shaping the surface of metals using a broach.190  There were two 
claims at issue, one of which recited a method for setting a broach 
in a clamp comprising, inter alia, the step of locking the broach 
into a fixed position by imposing a locking force on the broach in 
order to securely hold the broach in the clamp.191  By definition, 
one can clearly see that the limitation includes three acts: (1) 
locking the broach into a fixed position, (2) imposing a locking 
force on the broach, and (3) securely holding the broach in the 
                                                                                                             
whether the enactment of paragraph 3 of section 112 (now section 112(f)) rendered cases 
such as Halliburton obsolete or simply modified). 
188 Act Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/act (last visited May 28, 2014). 
189 Function Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/function (last visited May 28, 2014). 
190 Utica Enters., Inc. v. Fed. Broach & Mach. Co., 109 F. App’x 403, 405 (Fed. Cir. 
2004). 
191 Id. at 405–06. 
938 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 24:907 
 
clamp.192  More specifically, “locking the broach into a fixed 
position” is a function, because it is the purpose of “imposing a 
locking force on the broach.”193  Likewise, “securely holding the 
broach in the clamp” is a function, because it is the purpose of 
“locking the broach into a fixed position.”194  The limitation, 
therefore, includes three acts, but only two of them are functions. 
The example also illustrates another idea.  This is that the 
relationship between a function and an act is analogous to the 
relationship between a genus and species.  In general, a genus 
refers to a class within a hierarchy of living things having one or 
more attributes in common, whereas a species refers to a subclass 
within a genus having more attributes in common.  In other words, 
a genus comprises all of the species within that class.  Likewise, a 
function within the meaning of section 112(f) comprises all of the 
acts for performing that function.  Note, in the example, how the 
function of “locking [the] broach [into a fixed] position” is to 
“securely hold [the] broach [in the clamp.]”195  However, as noted 
above, “locking [the] broach [into a fixed position]” and “securely 
hold[ing the] broach [in the clamp]” are by definition both acts.196  
“Securely hold[ing the] broach [in the clamp]” just happens to be a 
certain type of act.197 
The point here is that a process claim limitation always recites 
an act in the generic sense of the word,198 because a function is 
merely an abstraction referring to a category of acts intended to 
accomplish a specified function.  Thus, in the example, “securely 
hold[ing the] broach [in the clamp]” refers to a category of acts 
which includes “locking [the] broach [into a fixed] position.”199  
Similarly, “locking [the] broach [into a fixed] position” refers to a 
category of acts which includes “imposing a locking force [on the 
                                                                                                             
192 See id. at 407–11 for the court’s actual findings of fact and conclusions. 
193 Id. at 405 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 6,256,857 (filed Jan. 21, 1997)). 
194 Id. 
195 Id. 
196 Id. 
197 Id. 
198 Cf. Smith, supra note 51, at 433 (implying that a “function” within the meaning of 
the third paragraph (now sixth paragraph) of section 112 is synonymous with “act”). 
199 Utica, 109 F. App’x at 405–06 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 6,256,857 (filed Jan. 21, 
1997)). 
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broach].”200  Until the Federal Circuit explores these concepts in 
greater detail, lower courts will continue to struggle with 
identifying step-plus-function limitations in process claims. 
In addition to the difficulty in distinguishing a function from an 
act, the current analysis is susceptible to claim constructions that 
contradict longstanding policy concerns with respect to functional 
claiming.  Given that the purpose of section 112(f) was to allow 
purely functional claiming limited only by the specific 
implementations of that function described in the specification or 
their equivalents, it seems highly unlikely that Congress intended 
for patent holders to circumvent the claim construction 
requirements of the statute by claiming purely functional 
limitations in process claims rather than product claims.  Yet, that 
appears to be what is happening. 
As early as O.I. Corp., the Federal Circuit stated unequivocally 
that each claim must be independently reviewed when determining 
the applicability of section 112(f).201  The court rejected the 
appellant’s “parallelism” argument, explaining that the recitation 
of a process claim limitation in language nearly identical to that 
recited in a means-plus-function limitation of a related product 
claim is not necessarily subject to step-plus-function treatment.202  
The court ultimately held that the limitation was not written in 
step-plus-function form.203  This issue arose again in Epcon Gas, 
where the court reiterated the same position: a process claim is not 
subject to section 112(f) simply because it recites a limitation in 
terms parallel to the terms used to describe the means-plus-
function limitation of a product claim.204  In sum, the very same 
language that is deemed “functional” for purposes of section 112(f) 
with respect to product claims is not regarded as “functional” with 
respect to process claims. 
                                                                                                             
200 Id. 
201 O.I. Corp. v. Tekmar Co., 115 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
202 Id. at 1583–84. 
203 Id. at 1583. 
204 Epcon Gas Sys., Inc. v. Bauer Compressors, Inc., 279 F.3d 1022, 1029 (Fed. Cir. 
2002). 
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In view of the policy concerns with respect to functional 
claiming that were addressed by the Court in Halliburton,205 it is 
unclear how a process claim limitation is any less threatening than 
a product claim limitation having nearly identical claim language.  
Consider, for example, a claimed invention which is directed to a 
software product and process for managing and tracking a life 
insurance policy.206  The product claim comprises several 
limitations, one of which includes an “investment determining 
means for determining an investment value.”207  Likewise, the 
process claim comprises several limitations, one of which includes 
“determining an investment value.”208 
                                                                                                             
205 Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1, 12 (1946). 
206 See U.S. Patent No. 5,926,792 (filed Sept. 9, 1996). 
207 Claim 1 of the ’792 patent, at issue in Bancorp Services LLC v. Sun Life Assurance 
Co. of Can., 687 F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2012), reads as follows: 
A computer system for managing a life insurance policy on 
behalf of a policy holder, the computer system comprising: 
generating means for generating a life insurance policy 
including a stable value protected investment with an initial value 
based on a value of underlying securities; 
fee calculating means for calculating fee units for members 
of a management group which manage the life insurance policy; 
credit calculating means for calculating surrender value 
protected investment credits for the life insurance policy; 
investment determining means for determining an 
investment value and a value of the underlying securities for the 
current day; 
policy calculating means for calculating a policy value and 
a policy unit value for the current day; 
storing means for storing the policy unit value for the 
current day; and 
one of: 
removing means for removing the fees units for members 
of the management group which manages the life insurance policy, 
and 
accumulating means for accumulating fee units on behalf of 
the management group. 
U.S. Patent No. 5,926,792 col. 15 ll. 47–48. 
208 In Bancorp Services LLC, Claim 9 of the ’792 patent was at issue and reads as 
follows: 
A method for managing a life insurance policy on behalf of 
a policy holder, the method comprising the steps of: 
generating a life insurance policy including a stable value 
protected investment with an initial value based on a value of 
underlying securities; 
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The product claim limitation recites a function of “determining 
an investment value” without reciting any structure for achieving 
that function; the limitation is therefore in means-plus-function 
form.209  On the other hand, a similar determination as to the 
process claim limitation is not as clear.  “[D]etermining an 
investment value” could refer to an act just as easily as it could 
refer to a function.210  Unfortunately, there is no way to reasonably 
determine whether the limitation should be deemed a function or 
an act without turning to the specification for the intended meaning 
and scope.  Nevertheless, absent the recital of “steps for” triggering 
a presumption in favor of applying section 112(f), and given that 
under the current approach that absence triggers the opposite 
presumption, the limitation would not likely be construed as a step-
plus-function limitation. 
Inconsistent outcomes such as these undoubtedly call into 
question the legitimacy and reasonableness of a statutory scheme 
which tolerates, through clever draftsmanship, different treatment 
of product and process claims employing essentially the same 
claim language.211  Consider, as a case in point, the implications of 
these outcomes.  On the one hand, construing claim language as a 
means-plus-function limitation is tantamount to saying that the 
language is purely functional.  On the other hand, not construing 
                                                                                                             
calculating fee units for members of a management group 
which manage the life insurance policy; 
calculating surrender value protected investment credits for 
the life insurance policy; 
determining an investment value and a value of the 
underlying securities for the current day; 
calculating a policy value and a policy unit value for the 
current day; 
storing the policy unit value for the current day; and 
one of the steps of: 
removing the fee units for members of the management 
group which manage the life insurance policy, and 
accumulating fee units on behalf of the management group. 
Id. col. 16 ll. 66–68 (emphasis added). 
209 Id. col. 15 ll. 47–48. 
210 Id. col. 16 ll. 66–68. 
211 Cf. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 
(2012) (internal citations omitted) (stating that statutes should not be interpreted “in ways 
that make patent eligibility ‘depend simply on the draftsman’s art’ without reference to 
the principles underlying the prohibition against patents for [natural laws]”). 
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essentially the same claim language as a step-plus-function 
limitation is equivalent to saying that the language is “not” purely 
functional.  In effect, the law is simultaneously treating essentially 
the same claim language as a purely functional limitation and a 
non-purely functional limitation.  In view of inconsistencies such 
as this, it seems untenable to maintain the current approach. 
IV. MODIFIED APPROACH 
Determining whether a process claim limitation is subject to 
section 112(f) should ideally be a straightforward yet structured 
analysis.  The analysis should be able to make the determination 
quickly, allowing courts time to focus on other pressing issues.  
Similarly, it should permit one and only one determination, and 
that determination should be consistent with the overall context of 
the claim, specification, and prosecution history of the patent.  
Furthermore, it should promote the underlying policy of the statute 
while applying the law so as to avoid exalting form over substance.  
The Federal Circuit’s current approach falls short of these 
objectives. 
To address these shortfalls, the Federal Circuit should adopt the 
following framework consisting of three simple steps.  First, the 
court determines the function of the claim limitation.  The 
“function” refers to what the limitation ultimately accomplishes 
relative to the overall context of the claim.  Importantly, the 
function must be understood in the context of the specification and 
prosecution history.  Second, the court determines whether the 
determined function is expressly stated in the limitation.  
Answering this question in the negative concludes the analysis.  In 
other words, the limitation is not in step-plus-function form if the 
function is not expressly stated therein.  If, however, the limitation 
expressly states the determined function, then the analysis 
proceeds to the next step.  Third and finally, the court determines 
whether the limitation recites any acts for performing the 
determined function.  “Acts” refer to how the determined function 
is accomplished.  That is, the “function” is the “what,” and the 
“act” is the “how.”  If the court determines that the limitation 
recites a function to the exclusion of any acts, then the limitation is 
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deemed to be written in step-plus-function form and thereby 
subject to the claim construction requirements of section 112(f).  
That said, if the limitation is still ambiguous at that point, the court 
should err on the side of caution by deeming the limitation a 
function and construing the claim in accordance with section 
112(f). 
To illustrate how the proposed analysis works in practice, 
consider the claim at issue in Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude 
Medical, Inc.212 discussed earlier.  There, the claim was for a 
method for stimulating a heart using a pacemaker.213  The method 
comprised several limitations, one of which included “determining 
a condition of the heart from among a plurality of conditions of the 
heart.”214  After finding a presumption against applying section 
112(f) in the absence of the term “steps for,” the Federal Circuit 
held that this specific limitation was not written in step-plus-
function form.215 
By contrast, the same limitation would have fared very 
differently under the proposed analysis.  As stated, the first step in 
the analysis is to determine the function of the limitation.  A quick 
examination reveals that the “determining” limitation recites either 
a function or an act, but not both.  Whether the recitation rises to 
the level of a function cannot be determined without more context.  
That is, whether “determining a condition of the heart” constitutes 
a “function” is indeterminable absent further evidence. 
Given the ambiguity, the analysis must broaden the scope of its 
examination so as to ascertain what the limitation ultimately 
accomplishes in the overall context of the claim.  According to the 
preamble, the overall objective of the method is to stimulate a heart 
through the use of a pacemaker.216  To that end, the claim recites a 
method comprising three limitations.217  Ignoring the limitation in 
dispute for the moment, the goals of the two other limitations are 
respectively to “select[] at least one mode of operation of the 
                                                                                                             
212 381 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
213 Id. at 1375. 
214 Id. 
215 Id. at 1381–82. 
216 Id. at 1375. 
217 Id. 
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implantable heart stimulator . . . corresponding to said determined 
condition” and to “treat said determined heart condition.”218  
Therefore, to accomplish the overall objective, the method must at 
least be capable of selecting the corresponding mode of operation 
and treating the determined heart condition.  Likewise, 
accomplishing the goals of the two other limitations presupposes 
that the method is capable of determining one of several heart 
conditions.  Thus, although the disputed limitation may accomplish 
any number of things, it must ultimately determine a particular 
condition of the heart.  Accordingly, the function of the disputed 
limitation is to determine a heart condition from a plurality of 
conditions of the heart. 
Moreover, this determination is consistent with the 
specification.  In fact, the specification uses “step” and “function” 
interchangeably when referring to limitations of the claimed 
method.219  More specifically, the specification discloses a process 
for determining the occurrence of a particular cardiac state using 
dedicated cardiac state evaluation circuitry.220  Additionally, the 
specification further discloses that determining the occurrence of a 
particular cardiac state may also be accomplished by using 
conventional logic circuitry.221  In other words, “using dedicated 
cardiac state evaluation circuitry” and “using conventional logic 
circuitry” are both acts describing how to determine heart 
conditions.  Surely, the function is to determine a condition of the 
heart in view of the specification’s disclosure and claim as a 
whole. 
Because the limitation recites the underlying function without 
the recital of any acts for accomplishing the function as required 
by the second and third steps of the proposed analysis, one must 
conclude that the limitation is written in step-plus-function form 
and thereby subject to the requirements of section 112(f). 
Although this proposal is not a dramatic departure from the 
current approach set forth in the Seal-Flex concurrence, the 
situation does not call for a dramatic response.  Rather, the 
                                                                                                             
218 Id. 
219 U.S. Pat. No. 4,407,288 col. 7 ll. 7–14 (filed Mar. 16, 1981). 
220 Id. at col. 9, l. 9 to col. 10, l. 18. 
221 Id. at col. 10, ll. 19–28. 
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situation dictates a measured response.  Judge Rader’s framework 
for analysis provides a solid foundation upon which new case law 
can build.  The objective of this proposal is to strengthen the 
current approach by addressing the shortfalls related thereto.222  To 
that end, the proposed analysis is (1) more straightforward than the 
current approach, (2) more structured than that approach, and (3) 
more likely than that approach to promote the policy concerns 
behind section 112(f).  The reasons are described below. 
First, rather than inquiring into the mind of a drafter to discern 
whether he or she intended to invoke application of section 112(f) 
based on the presence or absence of the term “steps for,” the 
proposed analysis cuts straight to the chase—what is the function?  
Although the presumptions drawn from these inquiries can be 
helpful, they have had the opposite effect in practice by pushing 
nearly all process claims to date outside of section 112(f).223  In 
any event, the presumptions are not determinative of the ultimate 
question as they merely assign the initial burden of proof to one of 
parties.  Regardless of the presumption, the court must still 
determine whether a function without acts is present. 
Moreover, the whole doctrine of presumptions regarding the 
applicability of section 112(f) is based on a principle taken from 
                                                                                                             
222 Of course, to accomplish this objective, the Federal Circuit will have to reinterpret 
the law.  In so doing, the court would have to sit en banc to overturn the “steps for” 
presumption; however, the USPTO has an important role to play as well since it is 
responsible for administering the statute.  As an administrative agency, the USPTO may 
establish rules and regulations governing its process and procedures.  Accordingly, it 
could establish a new regulation stating how section 112(f) will be applied to process 
claims during examination moving forward.  At the very least, it could adopt guidelines 
to assist examiners in reviewing process claims for compliance with the statute.  As a 
matter of fact, the USPTO has already issued supplemental guidelines on the examination 
of product claims with functional language.  Providing additional guidelines on the 
examination of process claims with functional language would be a natural extension of 
that initiative.  In addition to ensuring the development of a clear and complete record on 
the subject, such measures could potentially fast-track an appeal from a decision by the 
Office to the Federal Circuit as opposed to waiting for the same issue to arise in litigation 
involving an existing patent. 
223 See William Lee & Eugene Paige, Means Plus and Step Plus Function Claims: Do 
We Only Know Them When We See Them? 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 251, 
252 (1998) (suggesting that claim drafters may avoid using express language that would 
invoke section 112(f) for fear of having such claims narrowly construed during 
litigation). 
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means-plus-function case law.224  In those cases, a product claim is 
subject to means-plus-function treatment if (i) an element of the 
claim uses either the term “means for” or a nonstructural term and 
(ii) such term is described by a function without any structure or 
material in support thereof.225  The Federal Circuit has stated that 
merely using the term “means for” with functional language 
creates a presumption in favor of applying section 112(f) whereas 
the failure to use the term triggers the opposite presumption.226  It 
explained that “the use of the term ‘means’ has come to be so 
closely associated with ‘means-plus-function’ claiming that it is 
fair to say that the use of the term ‘means’ (particularly as used in 
the phrase ‘means for’) generally invokes” means-plus-function 
treatment.227 
The rationale for this principle, however, does not necessarily 
extend to step-plus-function cases.  “Although similar,” writes 
Judge Rader, “means and step-plus-function elements are not 
identical and require distinct analyses.”228  Indeed, “steps for” has 
not become “so closely associated” with step-plus-function claims 
as to trigger a presumption of any kind.  In fact, there is no case on 
point at the Federal Circuit to suggest such a proposition.  
Consequently, this presumption as well as the “reverse” 
presumption should not apply to process claims.229  Accordingly, 
the proposed analysis which does away with this presumption is 
more straightforward than the current one. 
Second, the proposed analysis is naturally disposed towards 
deciphering those process claims at the margins where the 
limitation recites either a function or an act, but not both.  Drawing 
a distinction between a function and an act is difficult, because the 
                                                                                                             
224 See Greenberg v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 91 F.3d 1580, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996) 
(noting the correlation between the use of “means-for” or “steps for” language and the 
intent to invoke what is now recognized as § 112(f)). 
225 See Lighting World, Inc. v. Birchwood Lighting, Inc., 382 F.3d 1354, 1358 (Fed. 
Cir. 2004). 
226 See Greenberg, 91 F.3d at 1584. 
227 Id. 
228 Seal-Flex, Inc. v. Athletic Track & Court Const., 172 F.3d 836, 848 (Fed. Cir. 
1999). 
229 See MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 576 (3d ed. 
2009) (questioning the significance of drawing a distinction between the recital of “steps 
of” and “steps for” on the step-plus-function analysis). 
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two concepts are substantially similar.  As noted above, however, 
there are differences.  The main difference is that a function is 
merely an abstraction referring to a category of acts, each of which 
performs the same function.  Yet, a function is itself an act.  Thus, 
a limitation may contain a plurality of acts at different levels of 
abstractness.  Nevertheless, where the limitation recites either a 
function or an act, there is no way to choose one over the other by 
simply looking at the claim language. 
The proposed analysis deals with this problem by providing a 
solid framework within which each determination must follow.  
Accordingly, determining whether a process claim limitation is 
purely functional turns on the overall context of the claim, 
specification, and prosecution history.230  Operating within this 
framework eliminates the tendency for a court to make bold 
assertions which are inconsistent with the intrinsic evidence.231  As 
a result, courts are more likely than not to draw one and only one 
conclusion on whether a process claim limitation is subject to the 
claim construction requirements of section 112(f).  Thus, the 
proposed analysis is more structured and straightforward than the 
current analysis. 
Third and finally, the proposed analysis is designed to construe 
and apply the law in a manner consistent with the policy concerns 
behind section 112(f).  As mentioned, there is no way to 
reasonably determine whether a process claim limitation is 
described in terms of function only without looking to the 
specification for the meaning and scope of that language.  
Requiring courts to review the specification when determining the 
applicability of this statutory provision would prevent these 
limitations from being misinterpreted.  As a result, courts would be 
less likely to exempt process claims from step-plus-function 
treatment in cases where the claim language is nearly identical to 
                                                                                                             
230 During prosecution, however, the determination would depend only on the claim 
and the specification.  If an examiner determines that the limitation is in step-plus-
function form, then the claim should be amended accordingly to indicate to others how 
the claim has been construed. 
231 Compare Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 381 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 
2004), with Serrano v. Telular Corp., 111 F.3d 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (construing 
limitations as the recitation of acts without any function even though the specification 
discloses specific acts for performing those limitations). 
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that of a corresponding means-plus-function product claim.  
Accordingly, the proposed analysis is more likely than the current 
one to result in outcomes where process claims employing purely 
functional language are cabined by this statutory provision. 
CONCLUSION 
Section 112(f) has been on the books for more than sixty years.  
Unfortunately, whether a process claim limitation is written in 
step-plus-function form remains an unresolved issue due to the 
lack of Federal Circuit case law in this area.  The current 
framework for analysis needs more structure in making those 
determinations and less emphasis on following presumptions 
applied in means-plus-function case law.  Absent the necessary 
framework, patent holders have been able to circumvent the 
limitations of section 112(f) by claiming a process rather than a 
product while using essentially the same purely functional 
language. 
As stated, functional claiming is particularly troublesome with 
software inventions.232  Computer programmers typically write 
programs to perform specific functions, so there is a natural 
tendency to disclose and claim those inventions in terms of 
functionality.  These functional limitations are inherently broad, 
subject to abuse, and therefore should be limited to the recitation of 
the structure, material, or acts for achieving a claimed function.233  
By failing to apply section 112(f), functional claiming 
impermissibly extends patent protection beyond the disclosed 
invention and beyond what was intended by the Patent Act.234 
In view of the turmoil surrounding software patent litigation 
today, it is important to bear in mind that section 112(f) was 
                                                                                                             
232 See Lemley, supra note 31, at 906–07; Brief for the Electronic Frontier Foundation 
and Public Knowledge as Amicus Curiae at 2, CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., 685 F.3d 
1341 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (No. 2011-1301). 
233 See, e.g., Masco Corp. v. United States, 303 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (reversing 
the district court’s claim construction invoking application of section 112(f) after 
determining that the function of driving the lever into the cam recited in the method claim 
step was limited by the act of transmitting a force to the lever). 
234 See, e.g., Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1, 10, 12 (1946); 
Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc., 381 F.3d 1371. 
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enacted in response to Halliburton.  The purpose of this statutory 
provision was to reinstate the practice of functional claiming, albeit 
in a particularly confined manner.235  In exchange for the privilege 
of employing this claim drafting technique, the scope of claimed 
subject matter is limited to the corresponding structure, material, or 
acts in the specification or equivalents thereof.236 
Currently, the validity of software patents is challenged on 
grounds of section 101 subject matter eligibility.  Section 112(f) 
and appropriate claim construction, however, may provide a better 
avenue to weed out and curtail patents with process claims that are 
overbroad and ambiguous, given that this avenue is especially 
provided for in the statute rather than an undefined, judicially 
created exception to patentability.  To do so, the Federal Circuit 
must first improve the current analysis in this area of the law. 
                                                                                                             
235 See In re Donaldson, 29 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1845, 1849 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
236 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (2012). 
